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Abstract
Intrinsically trustworthy agents never cheat. A society’s willing-
ness to trust and the quality of its institutions have their origins in the
intrinsic trustworthiness of its citizens. Trustworthiness is the basis
for maximizing output in economic exchange and in explaining differ-
ences in standards of living around the world. We measure intrinsic
trustworthiness with a question from the World Values Survey and
estimate its effect using a sample of 60 countries. We find that trust-
worthiness is important for output per capita and that the effect of
trust is likely to come from trustworthiness.
∗We would like to thank participants of the Conference of the International Society for
New Institutional Economics in Toronto, and the Economics Workshop at the University
of South Carolina for helpful comments.
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Surprisingly much of the literature on trust hardly mentions trust-
worthiness, even though much of it is primarily about trustwor-
thiness, not trust. Hardin (1992)
1 Introduction
Casual observation suggests that trustworthy behavior is an important de-
terminant of economic outcomes. If people are not trustworthy, a general
lack of trust is inevitable, and commerce suffers. One purpose of this paper
is to clarify the roles of trust and trustworthiness in economic exchange and
the generation of per capita income. We argue that trustworthiness is more
basic, and more important, than trust. The second purpose is to test this
hypothesis using a new measure of trustworthiness.
The theoretical framework has two parts. In the static part, we take the
levels of trusting and trustworthy behavior as given. Trust is important be-
cause people who trust are those who initiate transactions. If an individual
trusts, she offers a contract to jointly produce with someone of unknown
type. There are two types: the “intrinsically trustworthy” who always ful-
fill contracts, and “conditional operators” who either fulfill the contract or
cheat, depending on the expected reward. An initiated transaction creates
maximum output only if the contract is fulfilled.
In the second part, we outline a theory of the evolution of trust and
trustworthy behavior. We assume that the proportion of individuals who
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are intrinsically trustworthy in any society changes only slowly over time.
We believe that, historically, countries with a high proportion of trustworthy
people created good institutions that induced conditional operators to act as
if they were trustworthy. They did so by establishing fair and efficient mech-
anisms to punish cheating. With more trustworthy behavior, initiators had
greater reason to trust. This led to an expansion of transactions and output.
For countries with few intrinsically trustworthy people, the development of
good institutions proceeded at a slower pace. Hence, these countries have
achieved smaller gains from scale and specialization.
To date, the empirical literature in economics has focused on trust and
its effect on economic growth. This literature has found that more trusting
societies achieve higher rates of growth. Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and
Knack (2001), and Tabellini (2006) use the World Values Survey (2006) for
a measure of trust, whereas Temple and Johnson (1998) construct a measure
of “social capital” and Hall and Jones (1999) employ a measure of “social
infrastructure” – concepts closely related to trust. In this literature, trusting
behavior is said to generate cooperation and civic engagement, which can
enhance output.1 Many authors recognize that trustworthiness is important,
but there has been virtually no cross-country empirical work that deals with
it in a rigorous way.
1See Coleman (1988), Putnam (1993), La Porta et al. (1997), and others who consider
the effects of trust in organizations and social groups. Guiso et al. (2005) show that trust
is related to culture, and that low trust between countries results in low levels of trade
and capital flows.
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In this paper, we construct a measure of trustworthiness that allows us to
investigate the relative value of trust and trustworthiness in explaining GDP
per capita across countries. Like the usual measure for trust, our measure of
trustworthiness comes from the World Values Survey (2006). The measure
is based on a question that elicits from parents their subjective view of the
importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for others.2
Our base sample consists of 60 countries. In our econometric tests, we
find that trustworthiness consistently performs well in explaining per capita
output. The inclusion of control variables, including trust, changes the mag-
nitude, but not the significance of trustworthiness. At first, we maintain
the hypothesis that trustworthiness is exogenous. Later, we allow it to be
endogenous and use four different instruments to control for endogeneity. In
almost all of the cases, trustworthiness has a significant, first-order impact on
per capita income. Our data also support the structural framework that we
propose to explain why trustworthiness is fundamental in a way that trust is
not.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses trust and
trustworthiness as these concepts have been used in the literature of po-
litical science, sociology, and psychology. We also distinguish between our
notion of trustworthiness and that found in the experimental literature. In
Section 3, we construct a simple model of output per capita based on the
2The current paper builds on preliminary results in a our working paper, Breuer and
McDermott (2008)
4
existence of agents who each have two characteristics or dimensions, trust
and trustworthiness. After that, we outline a process by which the intrinsi-
cally trustworthy create institutions that encourage conditional operators to
behave as if they were trustworthy, thus inducing trust. Section 4 describes
the data that we use. Section 5 presents our econometric specifications and
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Trust and Trustworthiness
In his book Trust, Fukuyama (1995, p. 26) states that trust is“the expectation
that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior,
based on commonly shared norms, on the part of the members of that com-
munity.” Gambetta (1988) defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents
will perform a particular action.” In each of these, trust is equated with an
expectation about behavior. More importantly, these definitions point out
that the behavior of the party on the other end of the transaction is critical.
Trustworthiness matters.
In our view, trust is more than an expectation about behavior; trust is
based on an obligation agreed to in the face of uncertainty about whether a
counterparty will, in fact, fulfill an agreement. Trustworthiness means that
the counterparty fulfills the obligation. Without an obligation agreed on by
both parties, the issue of trusting is moot. A thought experiment might help
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clarify the point. Suppose we deposit $X into a bank account. For sake of
discussion, assume the ‘bank’ has no legal obligation to pay interest or return
our deposit. In this case, we are not really trusting that the bank will return
our money; we are simply making a guess about what it will do. We hope
the ‘bank’ will return our money with interest but we have no basis to say
“we trust the bank” because it is not obligated to do anything. The same is
true of trustworthiness. An action cannot be defined as trustworthy without
first defining an obligation. In our thought experiment, because the bank is
under no obligation to return money to us, if it returns nothing, it cannot be
considered ‘untrustworthy.’ Neither is it ‘trustworthy’ if it returns money.
There is a growing body of experimental literature that attempts to mea-
sure trust and trustworthiness with experiments similar to the thought ex-
periment above using a trust-honor (investment under uncertainty) game.
But, almost all of the experiments lack an obligation as a reference point
in the game design.3 This absence makes it difficult to interpret whether
trust and trustworthiness are being measured. Other researchers who use
the game have acknowledged that their results may be picking up cooper-
ation, reciprocity, unconditional kindness, altruism, inequity aversion, and
warm glow.4 Because our model is based on economic exchange where obli-
3The original game is from Berg et al. (1995). Modifications to the game include Ashraf
et al. (2006) who incorporate“expectations of return”; Ben-Ner and Putterman (2008) who
allow for pre-play communication and contracting; and Charness et al. (2008) who allow
for punishment by a third-party. Glaeser et al. (2000) correlate outcomes from experiments
from a trust-honor game and an envelope drop experiment with survey data.
4See Andreoni (1990), and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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gations, whether explicit or implicit, are commonplace, we will define trust
and trustworthiness around an obligation. In doing so, we depart from the
experimentalist’s notion of trust and trustworthiness.
We make an important distinction between intrinsic trustworthiness and
conditional trustworthiness. Intrinsic trustworthiness is unconditional; re-
gardless of the costs of behaving trustworthily, an individual who is intrin-
sically trustworthy, will always act so. The existence of individuals who are
intrinsically trustworthy has been assumed in the game-theoretic work of
Frank (1987), Harrington (1989), Huang and Wu (1994), and Bohnet et al.
(2001) in a similar context. Sen (1977) also assumes there are individuals
who are willing to take action that conflicts with self-interest (a type he
calls “committed”). In his study of rotating credit institutions in Peru, Kar-
lan (2005) conjectures that some of the respondents may have been innately
trustworthy.
In contrast, conditional trustworthiness is trustworthy behavior that is
conditional on the costs and benefits to behaving trustworthily. Both are
important. Whereas economies are endowed with a level of intrinsic trust-
worthiness, conditional trustworthiness is generated by good institutions. We
elaborate on this idea in Section 3.2.
Trustworthy behavior, therefore, comes from both intrinsically trustwor-
thy types and from conditional operators who have chosen to fulfill their
obligations. In this environment, trust ultimately depends on the expecta-
tion of being cheated, which in turn depends on the fraction of the population
7
that does not cheat – that is, acts in a trustworthy manner. Trust is “calcula-
tive”, to use Williamson’s (1993) term, and has no intrinsic component. Fehr
(2008) suggests that trust arises from beliefs about trustworthiness and pref-
erences toward risk.5 We are aware that the experimental literature imputes
to some people a feeling of deep satisfaction from trusting others – such as
giving money to an individual who comes up short in paying for groceries
while standing in line. Although some may consider this behavior a form
of intrinsic trust, we think of it as ‘kindness’ because there is no explicit or
implicit expectation about the behavior of the counterparty.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Production
In this section, we outline a simple theory of exchange to illustrate how trust
and trustworthiness matter for aggregate output. First, we assume that
agents extend trust to other agents to produce output. They extend trust
when they expect that counterparties will fulfill their end of an explicitly
specified bargain. Counterparties can be two types – intrinsically trustwor-
thy or conditional operators. Intrinsically trustworthy types always agree to
and do fulfill the obligation to participate in the production of output. Condi-
tional operators agree whether they intend to fulfill their obligations or not.
5See Breuer and McDermott (2009) for a model of risk aversion, institutions, and
expectations that determines aggregate trustworthiness, trust, and output per person.
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Because conditional operators conceal their true intent from the initiator,
their true type is not revealed until production occurs.
Individuals are defined along two dimensions: whether or not they trust
others and whether or not they can be trusted to completely fulfill a bargain.
There are, accordingly, four distinct types of individual in the economy de-
fined by the absence (0) or presence (1) of the two behaviors. Each person
is represented by her type aij where i = (0, 1) represents trust and j = (0, 1)
represents trustworthy behavior. For example, a person of type a01 does not
trust others but does demonstrate trustworthy behavior; a person of type a00
neither trusts nor can be trusted.
Trustworthy types – those with trait ai1 — may be intrinsically trust-
worthy or may be a conditional operator seeking to avoid penalties. It is
immaterial for production. We conceive of the production process as follows.
There are N agents who meet other agents over the course of the year; in the
limit, assume each agent encounters every other agent. Under this scheme,
there would be N (N − 1) meetings every year. Any two agents meet twice,
once as the initiator and once as the receiver. When a trusting agent (type
a1j) meets an individual who is trustworthy (type ai1) the maximum output
– which we call ym– is produced. Moreover, this output is divided equally
between the two parties.
When the same trusting agent (type a1j) meets an agent who does not
behave trustworthily (type ai0) output is lower, at the value yl. There is a
deadweight loss associated with deception. We express this loss as yl = δym
9
where 1
2
< δ < 1. When cheating occurs, we assume that the cheater gets
all of the output. Otherwise, people would always initiate transactions since
that would be better than refusing to initiate. 6
Aggregate output in the year depends on the proportions of people who
trust and can be trusted. Let the total fraction of people who behave trust-
worthily be
pTW = rTW + vTW < 1 (1)
where rTW is the fraction of people in the economy who are intrinsically
trustworthy and vTW is the fraction who are conditionally trustworthy. Fur-
thermore, let
pT < 1 (2)
be the fraction of people who trust others and initiate transactions.
Let M = N (N − 1) be the number of meetings between different indi-
viduals. Then:
Y = pTpTWMym + pT (1− pTW )Myl (3)
The number of meetings initiated by those who trust and directed to someone
who is trustworthy is pTpTWM . Each of these meetings results in output
of ym. The other meetings that result in output yield yl, and there are
pT (1− pTW )M of these. We add the two to get (3).7
6In our model, agents do not play a game: types are determined prior to the current
period, but no one knows the type of the person on the other side of the transaction. The
payoff matrix, however, is similar to the Trust-Honor variant of the prisoner’s dilemma
game in Bohnet et al. (2001) and Berg et al. (1995), among many others.
7Because self-meetings yield zero output, Equation (3) is an approximation to the true
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It is useful to write per capita output y = Y
N
as follows:
y =
(
1 + δ
(1− pTW )
pTW
)
pTpTW ym (N − 1) (4)
where δ = yl
ym
is the relative shortfall of output when people are not trustwor-
thy. We observe that living standards rise with both the fraction of people
who are trusting pT and the fraction who act honestly pTW . Living standards
also rise with ym, δ, and scale, N .
3.2 Intrinsic Trustworthiness, Institutions, and Trust
If everyone were intrinsically trustworthy, there would be no need for institu-
tions. No one would ever cheat and agents would soon learn to trust everyone.
Output would be at a maximum. Unfortunately, this is never the case. Coun-
tries have legal and economic institutions to make people behave as if they
were naturally trustworthy. Institutions elicit honest behavior through threat
of punishment or social pressure. Where institutions are good at suppressing
cheating, they induce conditional operators to behave honestly.8
value of output, except in the case of pT = pTW = 1, in which case it is exact. The error is
very small for large N , however; it is on the order of about one one-hundreth of a percent.
8The link between institutions and trust has been prominent in the work of Putnam
(1993), Coleman (1988), Beugelsdijk (2006), and Huck (1998), among others. There is,
on the other hand, a strand of the game-theory literature that examines how cooperative
behavior can evolve without the intervention of government institutions. See Axelrod
(1984), Ellison (1994), Huang and Wu (1994), and Kandori (1992).
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We express this relationship as follows:
ln v̂TW,j = αV + βV Ij + ηV j (5)
where v̂TW ≡ 1+ vTWrTW and I stands for institutions. The ratio of conditionally
trustworthy agents to intrinsically trustworthy agents increases linearly with
the quality of institutions. We also introduce an error term ηIj since this
relation is part of an empirical model to be estimated.
In itself, a rise in conditionally trustworthy behavior vTW is good: it
increases pTW in (1) which raises y by (4). But there is an added benefit:
as the mass of trustworthy agents rise, people learn to trust others. The
trust that we observe – the pT in (4) – is due to the existence of trustworthy
agents, whether intrinsic or induced by institutions. It is irrational to trust
others in an environment of dishonest agents. We assume this relationship is
linear in logs:
ln pT,j = αT + βT ln pTW,j + ηTj (6)
In countries with more trustworthy behavior, trust itself is higher.
Another key building block is that we assume good institutions come
fundamentally from rTW , the fraction of intrinsically trustworthy people in
society. Our reasoning has two elements. First, the intrinsically trustworthy
fundamentally embrace a respect for others in society. Thus, they value
the security of property and rule of law as devices to protect not only their
own freedom, but that of others, too. Good institutions may be seen as
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commitment mechanisms designed to ensure individual freedoms and the
protection of property rights over time. They increase the probability of
catching cheaters and to increase the penalty if a cheater is caught. Both of
these reduce the expected utility from cheating. At the margin, this causes
those who are not intrinsically trustworthy to behave honestly. As noted
in (5), it raises vTW . Changing probabilities or penalties, however, requires
institutional reform.
Second, a large share of intrinsically trustworthy agents rTW in the general
population is necessary to secure enough votes (or persuade enough influential
political leaders) to establish institutions that effectively punish cheaters with
high probability. We hypothesize that the greater is rTW , the better the
institutional environment:
Ij = αI + βI ln rTW,j + ηIj (7)
It is possible that this relationship is not linear; a threshold value of rTW
may be necessary before any appreciable improvement in institutions occurs.
After that, the quality of institutions may increase rapidly with the share
rTW , causing vTW to rise as well.
Lastly, we assume that human capital is itself an institution. Glaeser et al.
(2004) argue that human capital may be more deeply rooted and persistent
than some of the measures (like Expropriation Risk from the International
Country Risk Guide) that are used to represent high quality governmen-
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tal institutions. Since intrinsically trustworthy types respect the rights and
freedoms of others, it is natural to hypothesize that they also promote and
expand educational opportunities. Therefore, analogous to (7), we write:
Xj = αX + βXrTWj + ηXj (8)
where X is a measure of human capital. We think this is consistent with the
ideas of Acemoglu et al. (2005) who hypothesize that both education and
institutions (in their case, democracy) are determined by a third, common
variable. For us, that variable is trustworthiness.
The ideas in this section are no more than a sketch of a model designed
to help with the logic of the empirical section to follow. We now turn to a
discussion of the data that we use to test the importance of trustworthiness
in economic performance.
4 Data and Country Sample
Construction of our sample was guided by several considerations. First, we
use the question on trust from the World Values Survey (2006) that has been
used frequently in previous research.9 This question is A165 and is available
9The World Values Survey, initiated in 1981 as a companion of the European Values
Survey and the General Social Survey, contains thousands of questions on topics ranging
from “Perceptions of Life” to “Religion and Morale”, with useful sociodemographic infor-
mation. Between 1,000 and 2,000 people are interviewed in each country in each wave.
The World Values Survey is downloadable from wvs http://www.worldvaluessurvey.
com/services/index.html.
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in Wave 1 (1981), Wave 2 (1990), Wave 3 (1995), and Wave 4 (2000) of the
survey. The question reads:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
1. Most people can be trusted
2. Can’t be too careful
The question has been used by many authors in a wide variety of disciplines,
but there have been critics. It has been criticized, for example, as reflecting
the state of institutions and not a cultural or natural trait (see, for example,
Beugelsdijk (2006)). It has also been criticized by Miller and Mitamura
(2003) who argue that responses to the trust question may be influenced by
a society’s level of caution. A low trust society, by this measure, could instead
simply be more cautious or more prudent in their dealings. Taken in this light,
low trust may be considered a positive, instead of a negative factor for an
economy. Last, responses to the trust question measure “generalized trust”.
Since the trust question is vague, it is not clear what types of situations
people have in mind when they respond.
In spite of these concerns, we measure the fraction of those who trust in
a country pT using affirmative response rates (Answer 1) to the question. An
affirmative answer seems to reflect, at least in part, people’s confidence in
not being cheated. There is no way to tell if people are answering that “most
people can be trusted” because they believe in the innate goodness of others
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(i.e. the respondent views others as intrinsically trustworthy) or because
they have faith that institutions will discourage untrustworthy types from
cheating them (i.e. institutions have induced the respondent to be trusting).
To measure intrinsic trustworthiness rTW we use responses to question
A035 from the World Values Survey.10 Question A035 is part of a series
of questions that asks respondents to select up to five qualities that chil-
dren can be encouraged to learn at home. In Waves 3 and 4 of the World
Values Survey, respondents were given a list of ten qualities. These include
good manners, independence, hard work, feelings of responsibility, thrift, de-
termination and perseverance, religious faith, unselfishness, obedience, and
tolerance and respect for others. The qualities listed across each wave vary
to some degree, but question A035 appears in all four waves.11 Each question
begins with:
“Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to
learn at home. Which if any do you consider to be especially
important? Please choose up to five. CODE FIVE ONLY.”
Each question in the series is then followed by just one “quality”, e.g inde-
pendence, thrift, etc. Those who chose “tolerance and respect for others” we
10We considered several other questions – a question on honesty (A031) and a question
on lying (F127) used by Slemrod and Katusca´k (2005). A031 was only asked in the
1981 survey and F127 only in the 1990 survey. We also considered questions that Knack
and Keefer (1997) used to construct a measure of civic norms (which they mention may
be associated with trustworthiness). We did not use these questions because they are
situational and there may be a wide range of circumstances that respondents consider
when answering.
11We are aware of only one other paper that uses this question. Tabellini (2006) includes
it in his cultural index.
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consider to be intrinisically trustworthy.
This question, we believe, elicits the true character of the parent, not the
child. Respondents who feel it important to teach their children tolerance
and respect for others, in our view, do so because they themselves possess
these basic qualities.
Because survey respondents are asked to select five questions from a list
of 10 qualities, there is an opportunity cost to selecting any question. We
think that this cost elicits a true response. If, for example, the question were
framed as the direct “do you think it is important to teach your children
tolerance and respect for a others?” then people might respond “yes” even if
they did not really value it. Unlike responses to the trust question, we assume
that our measure of trustworthiness does not include a component that may
be induced by institutions. Our maintained hypothesis is that conditional
operators do not code “tolerance and respect for others” based on the legal or
social ramifications. In other words, we think that Question A035 measures
rTW and not pTW .
For each country, we tabulate the percentage of total respondents who
answered “most people can be trusted” to question A165 and those who se-
lected“tolerance and respect for others” to question A035. These percentages
correspond to pT and rTW . There is a fair amount of variation in our data.
For example, pT and rTW are 36% and 80% for the United States, but only
3% and 60% for Brazil. The first two lines of Table 1 show that overall the
fraction of people who are trusting is significantly smaller than the number
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who are intrinsically trustworthy. This could be picking up the fact that
some people who appear not to trust are really just cautious.
In constructing our data set from the World Values Survey, we decided
to exclude Waves 1 and 2 from the analysis because these waves are heavily
weighted with Western European and advanced economies and provide sub-
stantially less variation. Instead, we combined the countries from Waves 3
and 4 but eliminated duplicates; we only used data from Wave 3 if there is
no data from Wave 4 for that country.12
We also use data on GDP per capita (y) in purchasing power parity dollars
from the Penn World Table (v. 6.2); years of schooling in the population
aged 25 or older from Barro and Lee (2001) for human capital (X); and the
index of security of property rights from the Heritage Foundation, as a proxy
for institutions (I). A higher value implies better institutions (we recoded
property rights to make it conform to this rule).
The combined data yields a base set of observations for 60 countries.
Country coverage includes developed, developing, emerging, and transition
economies.13 Table 1 gives the basic descriptive statistics. We present the
12As a robustness check, we ran all of our main results using the opposite rule: discarding
the data for Wave 4 if there were duplicates. The results were virtually unchanged in terms
of the significance of the key coefficients.
13The countries is our sample are the following: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan,
Korea, Rep., Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Rep., Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan (China), Turkey, Uganda, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
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Table 1: Descriptive Data
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
pT 0.298 0.163 0.028 0.665
rTW 0.708 0.099 0.525 0.923
yj
yUS
0.416 0.276 0.031 1.0
Y ears Schoolingj
Y ears SchoolingUS
0.627 0.204 0.20 1.0
Property Rights 3.70 1.021 1 5
data for y, and Years Schooling relative to the United States. Property Rights
is based on a scale running from 1 to 5, with an average of 3.75.
Our basic result from Equation (4) is that both trust and trustworthiness
contribute to greater output per capita. Figures 1 and 2 show the scatter plots
of y against pT and y against rTW . The scatter plots reveal a clear positive
relationship, although there are significant outliers. Letting j index countries,
the bivariate regressions corresponding to the plots (robust standard errors
are in parentheses) are given by 14 :
yj = 6961
(1978)
+ 243.05 pT,j
(69.00)
R2 = 0.21 (9)
yj = −26293
(5134)
+ 572.36 rTW,j
(72.53)
R2 = 0.42 (10)
14We multiplied pT and rTW by 100 to convert them to percent.
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These equations show that both trust and intrinsic trustworthiness are sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with output per person.
5 Estimation
5.1 A Basic OLS Model
A model for output per capita based on (4) may be specified as:
ln yj = α0 + α1 ln pT,j + α2 ln pTW,j + α3 lnXj + µj (11)
where we include human capital Xj as a proxy for the value of each trans-
action ym in (4). We cannot estimate the relationship in this form, however,
because we do not have a measure of trustworthy behavior pTW .
We noted in (1) that pTW is equal to the sum of the natively trustworthy
rTW and the conditionally trustworthy vTW . In logs, :
ln pTW,j = ln rTW,j + ln v̂TW,j (12)
where, as noted earlier, v̂TW ≡ 1 + vTWrTW . In Section 3.2 we proposed three
structural equations to represent the basic theoretical framework. We collect
these and repeat them here:
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ln v̂TW,j = αV + βV Ij + ηV j (5)
ln pT,j = αT + βT ln pTW,j + ηTj (6)
Ij = αI + βI ln rTW,j + ηIj (7)
Xj = αX + βX ln rW + ηXj (8)
To proceed, we substitute (5) into (12) and the result into (11). This
yields our first estimating equation:
ln yj = β0 + β1 ln pT,j + β2 ln rTW,j + β3Ij + β4 lnXj + j (13)
where, as noted earlier, we use Property Rights for I and Years of Schooling
to represent human capital X.
Our initial strategy is to estimate Equation (13) with OLS. This is pri-
marily a benchmarking exercise, since it is likely that the regressors – with
the possible exception of rTW – are correlated with the error  in our cross
section data set.
Table 2 presents the results from estimating (13). The first two columns
show the results when the logs of pT and rTW are included one at a time, with
no other regressors. Both are quite significant, as we expect, given the levels
regressions reported earlier. And, like the levels regressions, trustworthiness
has a much larger coefficient than trust. The third column shows the results
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when we put the two together. In this case, only trustworthiness is significant.
The last three columns add Property Rights and Schooling, but otherwise
repeat the first three columns.15 Trustworthiness remains significant, al-
though the magnitude of its coefficient falls appreciably. Trust, on the other
hand is not significant in any specification. Property Rights and Schooling
are also highly significant and the highest adjusted R2 is 75%.
The results of Table 2 show a much stronger correlation between trust-
worthiness and performance than between trust and performance.
In Section 4 we noted that there were a total of 10 different “qualitities”
or “virtues” that a parent could teach their children. We are focussing on one
of those, “tolerance and respect for others”, which we have linked to intrinsic
trustworthiness. As a check to the robustness of our results, we added each
of the remaining nine virtues, one at a time, to the last specification in Table
2. That is, we ran the regression:
ln yj = β0 + β1 ln pT,j + β2 ln rTW,j + β3Ij + β4 lnXj + β5 lnZj + j (14)
where Z is one of the other virtues in the list that respondents were asked
to consider. Also, we put all 10 virtues in together. The results of this
exercise are shown in Table 3. In all cases, rTW remained correctly signed and
significant, almost always at 3% or better. Four of the remaining nine were
also significant: Hard Work (a030), Responsibility (a032), Religious Faith
15Our sample size decreases by three when we add Property Rights.
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Table 2: Basic OLS
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
lnTrust (ln pT )
0.53**
[0.00]
0.28
[0.13]
0.16
[0.21]
0.1
[0.46]
lnTrustworthiness
(ln rTW )
3.25**
[0.00]
2.74**
[0.00]
1.00**
[0.01]
0.84*
[0.04]
Property Rights
Index
0.38**
[0.00]
0.36**
[0.00]
0.36**
[0.00]
ln Schooling
0.92**
[0.00]
0.87**
[0.00]
0.84**
[0.00]
Constant 10.00** 10.42** 10.62** 6.26** 6.56** 6.69**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 60 60 60 57 57 57
Adj R2 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.74 0.75 0.75
Notes : Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%
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(a040), and Obedience (a042). However, only one of these, Responsibility,
had the correct sign. The other three not only had a negative sign, they were
also small in magnitude. When the other nine virtues were all included with
rTW in the same regression, only rTW was significant. No other virtue came
close to being significant.
5.2 A Reduced-form Model
Our main interest is in exploring the relationship between trustworthiness
and output per capita. However, equation (13) and the results in Table 2
may suffer from endogeneity bias. We are concerned that pT , I, and X may
be correlated with the error . First, consider institutions. As emphasized
by Acemoglu et al. (2001), rich countries may prefer better institutions. Or,
there may be a bias in the subjective construction of the property rights in-
dex, such that evaluators see better institutions in richer economies. Finally,
measurement error may be particularly acute in studies like these.
Our measure of trust pT is also likely to be correlated with the error.
As argued earlier – see Equation (6) – trustworthy behavior pTW , whether
intrinsic rTW or conditional vTW , determines trust pT . It does so because we
believe that trust is impossible without the expectation that the other party
is likely to be trustworthy. Use (5) in (12) and the result in (6) to see that
pT is correlated with institutions:
ln pT,j = δ0 + δ1 ln rTW,j + δ2Ij + υj (15)
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Table 3: Other Virtues Included: OLS
Dependent variable: ln y
Virtue (1) (2) (3) (4)
β2 =Coef
rTW
β5 = Coef
Other
N Adj-R2
Independence
1.00*
[0.01]
0.01
[0.96] 57 0.75
Hard Work
0.70+
[0.08]
-0.16*
[0.04] 56 0.75
Responsibility
0.94*
[0.01]
0.55+
[0.09] 57 0.76
Imagination
1.30*
[0.01]
-0.11
[0.44] 56 0.74
Thrift
1.08*
[0.01]
0.09
[0.49] 57 0.75
Determination
1.05*
[0.01]
-0.01
[0.94] 56 0.74
Religious Faith
0.86*
[0.02]
-0.19*
[0.05] 56 0.76
Unselfishness
1.01*
[0.03]
0.03
[0.77] 56 0.74
Obedience
1.09**
[0.01]
-0.17+
[0.09] 57 0.76
All Nine Other
Virtues
1.27+
[0.071] na 55 0.73
Notes : Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; +
at 10%. All regressions were run with Property Rights and Ln
Schooling included.
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Therefore, if I is correlated with the error in (13), so will be pT .
Human capital X will be correlated with the error also if the shocks
that determine I are correlated with those that determine X; that is, if
Cov (ηI , ηX) 6= 0.
One way around the endogeneity problem is to estimate our system in
reduced form. That does not allow us to estimate the structural coefficients,
but it does allow us to gauge the strength of trustworthiness’s overall impact
on income. The four structural relations (5), (6), (7), and (8), along with the
identity (12), can be combined with our initial estimating equation (13) to
produce a reduced-form equation in which y depends only on intrinsic trust-
worthiness rTW . We continue to assume that trustworthiness is exogenous.
Accordingly, we estmate the following reduced form:
ln yj = γ0 + γ1 ln rTW,j + ϑj (16)
We estimate this equation using OLS and the results are shown in Table 4.
The first column repeats Column 2 of Table 2. The rest of the table
adds regional or income indicator variables to see if we are inadvertently
picking up the influence of a some third effect that is correlated with both
y and rTW . The second column of Table 4 adds indicator variables for Sub-
Saharan Africa (SBSA), East Asia and the Pacific, (EAP ) and Latin Amer-
ica and Caribbean (LAC). Trustworthiness continues to be significant and
the African and Latin American indicators are significantly negative, but
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there is no explanatory power from the EAP indicator. Column 3 uses indi-
cators from the World Bank for low-income countries (LID) and high-income
countries (HID). Trustworthiness retains significance (although the magni-
tude falls) and both of these indicators are significant with the expected signs.
Column 4 repeats the exercise with a single dummy for OECD countries. The
results are similar: trustworthiness is significant and so is the indicator. The
adjusted R2 reaches 85% for the third specification.
The last two columns divide the sample into countries with income above
the sample median, and those with income below it. In the above-median
group, trustworthiness continues to be very significant. In the last column,
we see that trustworthiness is not significant for the below-median income
group. The adjusted R2 is only 3%. The mean trustworthiness for this
group is only 66% as compared to 75% for the higher income group. As we
expect, trust is also lower on average (23% compared to 36%). Neither is as
pronounced as the difference in mean income per capita, however, which is
$5,800 vs. $22,626.16
5.3 Instrumental Variables
To this point we have maintained the hypothesis that our measure of trust-
worthiness rTW is exogenous. Recall that rTW measures the proportion of the
population of the country that identifies “tolerance and respect for others” in
16The units for income per capita are International dollars of 2000, as reported in the
Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006).
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Table 4: Reduced-form OLS
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
Full
Sample
y ≥
ymed
y <
ymed
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
lnTrustworthiness
(ln rTW )
3.25**
[0.00]
2.91**
[0.00]
0.80*
[0.02]
1.20+
[0.05]
1.09**
[0.00]
0.9
[0.37]
SBSA
-1.37**
[0.00]
EAP
-0.58
[0.16]
LAC
-0.58**
[0.00]
LID
-1.07**
[0.00]
HID
1.17**
[0.00]
OECD
1.11**
[0.00]
Constant
10.42**
[0.00]
10.50**
[0.00]
9.09**
[0.00]
9.26**
[0.00]
10.31**
[0.00]
8.91**
[0.00]
Observations 60 60 60 60 30 30
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.42 0.85 0.56 0.3 0.03
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%
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the World Values Survey to be an important quality to teach their children.
We claimed that this proportion corresponds to a deep-seated character trait
and does not depend on income or institutions.
There are reasons, however, to be concerned about our exogeneity as-
sumption. If our measure of intrinsic trustworthiness rTW is correlated with
the error ϑ in (16), then the coefficient of interest γ1 is biased.
First, it is possible that we are measuring intrinsic trustworthiness with
error. After all, the question we use asks about respect and tolerance, not
trustworthiness per se. Second, since our measure of intrinsic trustworthiness
is based on a survey, it is possible that survey bias has occurred. If survey
respondents were over-sampled in urban regions – where individuals are more
likely to value “tolerance and respect for others” – that would introduce an
overestimate of the national average rTW .
Third, rTW and y may evolve together over time from the influence of
common, unobserved variables. We think of rTW as highly persistent over
time, but not completely constant. For example, families may first be only
conditionally trustworthy, but slowly develop intrinsic trustworthiness from
both habit and association with those that have the trait. The same forces
that encourage the acquisition of such morals may also lead to higher income.
A fourth possibility is that rTW is more dependent on current y than we
have assumed. Although we do not believe this to be the case, it is possible
that rTW is higher because y is higher. If true, however, it means that y and
rTW are simultaneously determined. This is a classic problem that causes
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correlation between the regressor and the error.
To correct for endogeneity, we instrument for rTW . We consider four dif-
ferent instruments: two past values of “Constraint on the Executive” (lags of
50 and 100 years) from the Polity IV database, which we label ConstraintExec 50
and ConstraintExec 100; the variable Latitude, which is the absolute value
of the country’s latitude measured as a fraction of 90 degrees; and Mortality,
which is the measure of potential European settler mortality from Acemoglu
et al. (2001). Constraint on the Executive has been used by Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) and others as a measure of the quality of institutions.
We consider the first two to be measures of the quality of early institu-
tions, which we think are highly correlated with early intrinsic trustworthi-
ness. It is likely that the value of rTW in the past – not the present – is the
key to institution formation. Since we do not have data on historical values
of rTW , we assume that today’s value of rTW for which we do have data, is
highly correlated with past values of I.
Latitude has been used by Hall and Jones (1999) and Glaeser et al. (2004)
among others to instrument for current institutions. Hall and Jones use it
as a measure of Western European influence on the set-up and subsequent
development of social infrastructure. The idea is that higher latitudes were
both sparsely populated and similar in climate to Western Europe itself, both
of which encouraged settlement and colonization by Europeans who brought
their institutions with them.
We extend the argument to distinguish between types of settlers: we
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conjecture that more trustworthy Europeans migrated to higher latitudes
because the difficult working conditions and the small size of settlements
made life difficult for dishonest agents. Small settlement size, for example,
made detection of transgressions easier. The lack of large-scale extractive
industries – which were found mainly at low latitudes – made it more difficult
to find profitable opportunities to take advantage of native peoples or other
settlers.
Settler mortality was introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2001) as an instru-
ment for current institutions. The idea is similar: where settler mortality was
low Europeans were more likely to settle and construct good institutions.
We estimate Equation (16) using instruments for ln rTW . This estimation
strategy is valid if all of our instruments work only through current intrinsic
trustworthiness. We think this is a reasonable working hypothesis and, in any
case, there is much precedent for similar strategies in the recent literature.17
As a check, we also include our instruments one at a time as exogenous
regressors (and instruments) in some specifications.
Table 5 presents the main results. The first column uses ConstraintExec 50
and Latitude as instruments for rTW ; the second uses ConstraintExec 100
and Latitude. The results are broadly similar: the log of rTW is highly signif-
icant in explaining y; moreover, the magnitude of the point estimate is quite
large. Columns (3) – (6) include the instruments as regressors one at a time.
17Most of the work on institutions and growth, including Acemoglu et al. (2001); Glaeser
et al. (2004); Hall and Jones (1999); Hausmann et al. (2005), employ a similar assumption.
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Trustworthiness is significant at 5% or better in three of the four cases (and
it is almost significant when ConstraintExec 100 is included). The included
instruments are never significant. The last column uses Mortality as the
lone instrument for ln rTW . Again, we see that trustworthiness is both highly
significant and has a large impact on y.18
As a robustness check, we added another virtue, one at a time, to the
basic specification. That is, instead of using (16), we ran:
ln yj = γ0 + γ1 ln rTW,j + γ2 lnZj + ϑj (17)
and used Constraint Exec 50 and Latitude as instruments for both virtues.
This gave us nine different point estimates for γ1 and γ2. In these pairs, γ1 was
significant in six of the nine cases, and γ2 was never significant. As before,
we take this as a strong indication that there is something unique about the
quality “respect for others” that we have identified with trustworthiness.
Living standards as measured by y are strongly related to our measure of
trustworthiness, no matter which technique we use.
5.4 Structural Estimation
In this section we test to see if there is support for the structure as described
by Equations (5), (6), (7), and (8). These equations show that our mea-
18The first stages of the IV equations are reasonable. All are significant with one ex-
ception, Latitude when the other instrument is Constraint Exec 100. The adj-R2s are not
especially high, however, and are all around 16%.
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables
Dependent variable: ln y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Instruments → CE50
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
CE50,
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
CE50
Lat.
CE100
Lat.
Mort.
lnTrustworthiness
ln rTW
9.54** 9.09** 11.48* 10.82 7.25* 8.14* 11.31**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.14] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00]
Constraint Exec
50
-0.06
[0.55]
Constraint Exec
100
-0.05
[0.78]
Latitude 0.94 0.48
[0.35] [0.71]
Constant 12.53** 12.52** 13.48** 13.33** 11.36** 11.99** 13.27**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 48 36 48 36 48 36 24
Prob > F 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.035 0.000 0.004 0.000
Notes: Robust p values in brackets. **significant 1%; * at 5%; + at 10%.
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sures of trust, institutions, and human capital should all be determined by
trustworthiness.
The first three columns of Table 6 run OLS regressions for trust, institu-
tions, and human capital on ln rTW . In all cases, trustworthiness is significant
at the 1% level. Since we cannot be sure that trustworthiness is exogenous,
we also estimate each specification using Constraint50 – or Constraint100
– and Latitude as instruments for ln rTW . These results are shown in the
last six columns of Table 6. The results in Columns (4) - (9) confirm that
trustworthiness is highly correlated with all three structural variables. In
each case, moreover, the coefficients rise substantially when we go to IV
estimation.
These results support our idea that trust depends on trustworthiness.
They are also consistent with the idea that institutions and education are,
fundamentally, dependent upon the degree of trustworthiness in society.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we drew a distinction between two types of agents: the in-
trinsically trustworthy and conditional operators. The former always honor
contracts; the latter do only if it is in their self interest. In our view, the pro-
portion of the intrinsically trustworthy is the key to development and higher
per capita income. The greater the fraction of natively trustworthy people,
the greater the likelihood that institutions will be established to encourage
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conditional operators to behave in a trustworthy manner. As trustworthy
behavior grows, so does trust, and output expands. Trust, while secondary,
is still very important. Without trust, transactions would not be initiated
and scale would be small.
To test our hypotheses we used a new question from the World Values
Survey to measure intrinsic trustworthiness. This question elicits the respon-
dent’s feeling about the importance of a particular quality – “tolerance and
respect for others” – out of a list of 10 such qualities. Using this as a proxy
for intrinsic trustworthiness, we found that it was highly significant in ex-
plaining per capita income in a wide variety of specifications. In particular,
it outperformed trust (measured by the usual question from the World Val-
ues Survey) when the two were in the same regression. It also outperformed
all of the other nine virtues on the list when we added them one at a time
to the basic specification. In addition to treating intrinsic trustworthiness
as exogenous, we instrumented for it using lagged values of an institutional
variable, latitude, and European settler mortality. In all cases, it was highly
significant and it effect was large.
We also tested the structural building blocks of our theoretical framework,
to see if trust, present institutions, and current human capital were deter-
mined by intrinsic trustworthiness. All appeared to be, using both ordinary
least squares and instrumental variables.
The positive contribution of this paper is to point out the importance of
cultivating trustworthiness in society. Where there is a long historical record
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of conflict between groups or classes, or between citizens and the government,
the process of transformation will be very difficult. Nevertheless, policies that
succeed in the long run will be those that, whatever their economic merits,
are fair and impartial and promote trustworthy behavior among all citizens.
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